Nearly all Internet services rely on the Domain Name System (DNS) to resolve human-readable names to IP addresses. However, the content of DNS queries and responses can reveal private information, from the websites that a user visits to the types of devices on a network. Industry and researchers have responded in recent years to the inherent privacy risks of DNS information, focusing on tunneling DNS traffic over encrypted transport and application protocols. One such mechanism, DNS-over-HTTPS (DoH) places DNS functionality directly in the web browser itself to direct DNS queries to a trusted recursive resolver (resolver) over encrypted HTTPS connections. The DoH architecture solves privacy risks (e.g., eavesdropping) but introduces new concerns, including those associated with the centralization of DNS queries to the operator of a single recursive resolver that is selected by the browser vendor. It also introduces potential performance problems: if a client's resolver is not proximal to the content delivery network that ultimately serves the content, the CDN may fail to optimally localize the client. In this paper, we revisit the trend towards centralized DNS and explore re-decentralizing the critical Internet protocol, such that clients might leverage multiple DNS resolvers when resolving domain names and retrieving content. We propose and evaluate several candidate decentralized architectures, laying the groundwork for future research to explore decentralized, encrypted DNS architectures that strike a balance between privacy and performance.
Introduction
The Domain Name System (DNS) serves the essential function of mapping human-readable names to IP addresses and is central to the operation of most Internet services. DNS is nearly 40 years old, and until recently DNS queries and responses have not been encrypted. Recent concerns over user privacy, however, have focused attention on the DNS and the various privacy risks associated with being able to observe DNS queries and responses. For example, DNS queries can reveal the websites (and webpages) that a user is visiting, the connected devices they own, and even how they interact with those devices in the physical world. Because DNS queries and responses have generally been transmitted in the clear, any entity who can observe the DNS could also gain insight into a wealth of private information about an individual.
In light of these concerns, recent proposals to encrypt DNS queries and responses have emerged, including transmitting DNS queries and responses over Transport Layer Security (DNS-over-TLS, or DoT) and Secure HTTP (DNSover-HTTPS, or DoH). One approach to deployment has been to configure a client device with a single, recursive resolver that is responsible for terminating the encrypted communications channel and resolving all of the client's DNS queries. In the case of Mozilla's Firefox browser, this resolver is called a trusted recursive resolver (TRR). In the case of DoT, the client software might be the operating system (e.g., the Android OS has a "private DNS" option that routes all DNS traffic to Google's DoT resolver) or a browser (e.g., the Firefox browser has an option to enable DoH that results in all DNS traffic being exchanged with Cloudflare). These architectures cause all of a client's DNS traffic to be exchanged with a single entity, even as that client changes networks and physical locations, potentially introducing new privacy and reliability concerns.
Yet, encrypting DNS should not require centralizing it. In fact, as operating systems and browsers move to encrypt DNS, we are witnessing a proliferation of resolvers, run by a variety of independent entities. Distributing encrypted DNS queries across these resolvers could preserve the confidentiality benefits of encrypting DNS traffic without introducing new reliability and privacy concerns that would arise from centralizing it. Distributed resolvers, operated by independent organizations, can allow clients to achieve the privacy benefits of encrypting the DNS while also avoiding the risks of centralizing it.
Distributing DNS queries across multiple resolvers has the potential to avoid privacy and reliability risks associated with centralization, the central question is how to do so. In particular, relying on multiple resolvers to resolve DNS queries requires a strategy for directing each DNS query to an appropriate resolver; different choices have implications for both privacy and performance. This paper does not aim to provide the final word on the "best" strategy for distributing DNS queries across resolvers; rather, we aim to show that doing so is possible architecturally, to show that there are many feasible strategies for doing so that involve tradeoffs between privacy and performance, and to take a first step towards quantifying the performance tradeoffs of different resolver selection strategies.
We evaluate several different resolver selection strategies: (1) randomly distributing queries for DNS domain names across a set of proximal resolvers; (2) sending DNS queries to the resolver associated with the content delivery network that is ultimately responsible for serving the associated web objects. Both of these strategies offer different privacy benefits: random assignment ensures that no single entity amasses extensive information about a client's DNS query patterns, and assignment based on CDN affinity ensures that a CDN who operates a resolver learns no additional information about the domains that a client is visiting (since it must serve the associated objects, in any case).
An open question, however, is the effects of these strategies on performance, particularly on page load time. Of particular concern is the effects of these strategies on the ability of a CDN to localize clients: specifically, sending DNS queries through a resolver that is not proximal to the client may affect client localization and thus the ability of a CDN to map the client to a nearby CDN cache node, thus inhibiting page loads. On the other hand, a CDN that both resolves DNS names and serves the associated objects may be able to better localize clients for those objects, and might even be able to proactively resolve DNS queries associated with future object requests. Our goal in this paper is to explore the performance implications of these two different architectures. In both cases, we compare web page load times against the baseline architectures of relying on a single trusted resolver, and against default DNS lookups.
To measure these effects, we instrumented Mozilla Firefox to resolve DNS queries using each of the above strategies and measured the corresponding page load times for each resolver selection strategy. Randomly selecting a proximal resolver for each domain name to resolve results in a median performance loss of tens of milliseconds versus simply using the default local resolver, suggesting a marginal performance loss for corresponding potential privacy benefits. Alternatively, sending DNS queries to a resolver that is co-located with the CDN that hosts the corresponding objects yields a median improvement in page load time of more than 100 milliseconds for both Google and Cloudflare. In this paper, we focus on the performance effects of different selection strategies, using unencrypted DNS as the baseline for comparison. This paper explores the architectural feasibility and performance implications of different strategies for distributing DNS queries across resolvers. It is, however, far from the last word on architectures and strategies for distributing DNS queries. First, although we evaluate two possible strategies for distributing DNS, many others are possible. Second, to facilitate browser-based measurements, we focus on the performance effects of distributing unencrypted DNS queries across resolvers; future work could extend this study to perform similar measurements with DoT and DoH as browser and device support for these protocols become more prevalent. To encourage the reproducibility of our study and facilitate these extensions to our work, we have released our complete test harness and measurements to the community.
Background and Related Work
In this section, we provide background on recent developments in DNS encryption-specifically DNS-over-TLS and DNS-over-HTTPS-as well as related previous work exploring the relationships between DNS and performance.
Current Trends in DNS Centralization
The Domain Name System (DNS) resolves humanreadable domain names to IP addresses [15] . When a client application needs to resolve a domain name, its stub resolver typically issues a recursive DNS query to a local recursive resolver. Often, a client's local recursive resolver is automatically configured at the same time as when it receives its IP address on the local network (e.g., using a configuration protocol such as the Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol, or DHCP). The local recursive resolver will either have the answer for the query cached (i.e., from a previous query), or it will perform a sequence of "iterative" queries to authoritative name servers to resolve the domain name, cache the resulting response, and return the response to the client.
DNS queries and responses have historically been unencrypted, which has garnered increasing concern in recent years, given various demonstrations that DNS traffic can be used to discover private information about users, ranging from the websites and webpages that they visit to the "smart" devices that they use (and how they operate them). Significant concern has been raised, for example, by the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) over an Internet service provider's ability to observe their subscribers DNS traffic. A more common threat scenario, however, may be that of a user who associates to a wireless network for convenience (e.g., in a coffee shop, airport, or any public space) and subsequently sends DNS queries to an associated DNS resolver, in cleartext [3] .
Increasing concern over these scenarios has led to various developments to encrypt DNS queries and responses.
Two such developments are DNS-over-TLS (DoT) [10] and DNS-over-HTTPS (DoH) [8] . Many DNS services, including Google, Cloudflare, Quad9, and others now provide services for both DoT and DoH. The challenge, naturally, concerns configuring clients to use these protocols. Recent proposals from Mozilla and Google involve sending DoH queries directly from the browser to a "trusted" recursive resolver (resolver) as configured in the browser (perhaps even by default, although as of this writing the default settings have not yet changed). Similarly, the Android OS makes it possible to route all DNS queries via DoT to a Google-operated resolver [13] .
To date, however, clients that are configured to use DoT or DoH operate using centralized architectures, whereby the client sends all DoT or DoH queries to a single recursive resolver. Such an architecture solves one privacy problem but creates a new one-that of a single entity who now sees all DNS queries for a user, from all devices, for all networks and locations. In this sense, existing DoT and DoH architectures have not solved any privacy problem-they have simply moved the problem elsewhere, from one Internet entity (the ISP) to another (a content provider, ad network, etc.).
Furthermore, existing DoH and DoT architectures have introduced new performance concerns, since many CDNs map clients to nearby web caches based on the location of the client's recursive resolver. Of course, if the CDN operator and the resolver operator are the same party (as may be the case for certain objects, in the case of Cloudflare and Google), this concern is somewhat mitigated, because the DNS operator sees the client's IP address in any case. In cases where the CDN does not operate the resolver, however, there are some concerns that performance may suffer, if the CDN mistakenly maps a client to a cache based on the location of the resolver that is not located within client's ISP. These relative performance effects have not been studied extensively in the context of various DoH and DoT architectures, which is one of the aims of our study.
Related Work
In this section, we compare to related work on architectural changes to DNS, and we discuss related work on how DNS affects web performance. DNS Privacy Schmitt et al. proposed Oblivious DNS, a new architecture that prevents recursive resolvers from associating queries with the clients that issue them [22] . ODNS does not require changes to recursive resolvers or authoritative servers, but the original design proposal does not involve distributed recursive resolvers. Pauly et al. proposed Adaptive DNS as a method to enable clients to send encrypted DNS queries to cloud-based resolvers and send queries for private domain names to local resolvers [12] . In Adaptive DNS, queries are selectively distributed to multiple resolvers; there have been no studies of the performance of Adaptive DNS. DNS and Web Performance Sundaresan et al. [24] measured and identified performance bottlenecks for web page load time in broadband access networks and found that page load times are influenced by slow DNS response times and can be improved by prefetching. An important distinction is that they define the DNS response time only as the response time for the first domain, while we consider the set of unique fully qualified domain names of all resources contained in a page. They investigate only nine high-profile websites, which stands in contrast to the 2,000 popular and normal websites that we analyze, and they estimate page load times through Mirage and validate their findings through a headless browser PhantomJS, while we utilize Mozilla Firefox, which is a full browser.
Wang et al. [26] introduced WProf, a profiling tool to analyze page load performance. They identified that DNS queries-in particular uncached, cold queries-can significantly affect web performance, accounting for up to 13% of the critical path delay for page load times. In 2012, Otto et al. [18] found that CDN performance was negatively affected when clients choose recursive resolvers that were geographically separated from CDN caches. We believe that this was due to the fact that resolvers did not support ECS at the time (ECS was only introduced in January 2011, and standardized in May 2016) and CDNs only slowly started adopting anycast. Therefore, clients were likely redirected to sub-optimal data center based on the resolver's address, instead of the client's address. We suspect that with the wide-spread adoption of ECS and anycast since 2012, CDN performance may not be as negatively affected by choosing a resolver that is geographically far away from a CDN.
Otto et al. introduced namehelp, a DNS proxy running on a client's machine that improves web performance [19] . It is designed to help CDNs more accurately map clients to CDN-hosted content. First, the client queries their configured recursive resolver for a domain name. When the client receives a DNS response from a recursive resolver, the proxy checks if there is a CNAME indicating that the query was re-directed to a CDN. If so, the proxy queries the recursive resolver to look up the authoritative server for the CNAME. The proxy finished by directly querying the authoritative server for the CNAME, which is operated by the CDN. This enables the CDN to directly use the client's IP address to map the client to nearby servers, rather than relying on the recursive resolver, which may improve page load times. However, if the CNAME's authoritative server is not already the client's cache, then namehelp induces additional delay in DNS resolution times.
In this section, we present various approaches for distributing DNS queries from clients across sets of recursive resolvers. We explore two different approaches: (1) the client sends queries for each DNS domain name to a random resolver (Section 3.1); and (2) the client sends DNS queries to the resolver for the primary content delivery network corresponding to the website and associated objects for that site, all other DNS queries to the client's default local resolver (Section 3.2). In this section, we focus on describing the different strategies for decentralizing DNS queries across multiple resolvers; Section 4.1 describes in more detail how we implemented these strategies.
Random Distribution
A simple approach to distributing DNS queries across resolvers is to send each DNS query to a random resolver. By randomly distributing n queries to K multiple resolvers, each resolver receives n/K of the queries on average, in theory limiting the amount of information that any single entity learns from a client's DNS queries. This approach is also easy to implement and can be deployed at a web browser, a stub resolver, or a DNS forwarder.
The random distribution we implement assigns each domain name to a resolver that is randomly selected from a pre-defined list. Queries for each domain are thus routed to a different randomly selected resolver. dnsmasq in principle allows all queries from a given 2LD to be routed to the same resolver, which could potentially result in fewer cache misses for authoritative DNS servers; on the other hand, different subdomains could be managed by different entities, and for simplicity of implementation we simply assigned each domain name from a complete list of objects corresponding to a corpus of websites for this study (i.e., the top 100 websites from the Tranco top list, as described in Section 4.1) to a different resolver.
There are other ways to distribute DNS queries randomly across a resolver that could be explored further. For example, another approach would be to map all subdomains of a 2LD to the same resolver, rather than distributing all subdomains randomly across resolvers [2] . Hoang et al. evaluate DNS performance using such an approach as well as how many unique domain names get mapped to each resolver with various sets of websites that a user may visit [7] .
CDN-Based Distribution
Much web content is hosted by content delivery networks (CDNs), which use the DNS to assign clients to nearby replicas of the web content. CDNs map queries for content to nearby cache nodes that host the content, relying on the location of the client's recursive resolver to map the client to a nearby cache. A prominent concern with various proposals for DoH and DoT is that the resolver that a client uses may not be close to the client, thus causing the client to be mapped to a copy of the content that is far from the client itself. Increasingly, however, some CDNs, including Cloudflare and Google, are hosting their own resolvers, which mitigates this problem, since they could then see the queries and the corresponding IP address of the client-thus allowing the CDN to map the client's location directly.
CDNs are increasingly hosting resolvers, with the assumed approach being that a client would send all of its DNS queries to that single entity, regardless of whether the CDN hosted the corresponding content. Such an approach would certainly facilitate encrypted DNS transport (e.g., via DoH), but it would also result in potential privacy leaks: the CDN operator would come to learn of DNS lookups for objects, devices, and other activities that are not associated with the content that it is serving to the client. An alternative approach, which we call the Single CDN distribution, is to direct only the DNS queries that are associated with the CDN-hosted content to the CDN's resolver; the client sends all other DNS queries to the client's local recursive resolver. Figure 1 shows the step-by-step operation of this approach. Our hypothesis is that such a approach could improve performance over both a baseline approach of sending all queries to the local resolver, and the random approach (Section 3.1), since the CDN that hosts the object would learn the location of the client from the queries it sends directly to the resolver. On the other hand, the approach has better privacy properties that simply directing all queries to a single CDN's resolver, since the CDN does not come to learn about DNS queries for which it is already serving content. In this sense, this approach results in no additional information leakage about the client's browsing behavior to the CDN, since any information the CDN operator learns about the client's behavior from the DNS queries is already would already learn by serving the corresponding objects. On the other hand, DNS queries that the client would have otherwise sent to an ISP resolver and encrypted and sent to the CDN, thus resulting in an overall reduction in information that is leaked via DNS queries.
The Single CDN approach is more complicated to implement since it requires the client to distribute queries to determine which queries to resolve at the resolver corresponding to the CDN-hosted objects. This approach essentially requires each domain name to be resolved in advance to determine which names resolve to objects that are hosted on the CDN. To do so, we sent queries for all names to a recursive resolver and subsequently performed a WHOIS/RDAP lookup on the addresses that are returned to determine the organization that owns each corresponding IP address. (This initial mapping need only occur once; subsequent lookups can be sent directly to the CDN's resolver, as appropriate.)
Although our approach to determining the mapping between domain names and CDNs is cumbersome, in-progress Internet drafts, including one authored by Cloudflare, aim to streamline this process in the future. In particular, the standard would allow a CDN to specify to clients which resolvers should be used for each object on a page [21] , thus allowing clients to know in advance which domain names have content that is hosted by a CDN; this information could then be incorporated directly into a DNS forwarder such as dnsmasq. The draft has not yet been adopted by an IETF working group, however, and its status is thus somewhat unclear, especially in light of various security and privacy risks associated with the approach. It nonetheless offers a glimpse of how future Internet architectures might enable the approach we are proposing.
How Does D-DNS Affect Performance?
In this section, we describe our results for page load times and query response times, and we compare the network distance to CDN-hosted content when the CDN-based approach and the local resolver were used. We performed our measurements between February 4th, 2020 and February 7th, 2020. Page loads and DNS measurements were performed back to back, and we did not introduce delay between successive measurements.
Experiment Design
Following, we describe the methodology underlying our experiments to measure how D-DNS approaches affect web performance. We first define the performance metrics and explain how we measure them, and we then describe our experiment setup and the limitations of our measurements. 
Metrics
To understand how different distribution approaches affect web performance, we measure page load times, DNS resolution times, and object download times. We also analyze the effectiveness of the CDN-based approach by measuring the network distance to servers that host CDN content. Page Load Time We measure page load times of a website through a full browser, Mozilla Firefox 67.0.4, which we use in headless mode controlled by Selenium to record HTTP Archive objects (HARs) [25]. In particular, the HAR contains the onLoad timing, which measures the elapsed time between when a page load began to when the load event was fired.
The load event is fired when a web page and all of its resources have completely loaded. It is specified in the HTML Living Standard and it is available in all major browser vendors [17] . In fact, it has also been used to measure page load times in previous research on web performance [4, 6] . A related event is DOMContentLoaded, which is fired when a web page's markup (HTML) has been completely loaded and parsed by the browser. Unlike the load event, the DOMContentLoaded event does not include the time for downloading and rendering each object on a web page. However, including this time is necessary to truly understand how selection of recursive resolvers affects page load times [16] .
An alternative metric to page load time would be abovethe-fold rendering time (AFT), which measures the time it takes to download and render content that is initially viewable. The motivation for measuring AFT is that users may perceive a page load to have finished before all the objects have actually been rendered. However, accurately measuring AFT is challenging: We would need to record the start time and end time of rendering within the browser's dimensions for each page load [23] , which would require invasive modifications to the browser, which themselves could negatively affect true rendering times, or we would need to visually record the full rendering process and analyzing the recorded video, which is prohibitively expensive. Moreover, although the AFT might indicate that a browser has finished loading the page, a user may not be able to interact with it yet, and may not actually perceive the websites as having loaded. Correspondingly, we rely on page load time (time of load event) for our measurements. DNS Query Response Time We measure unencrypted DNS-over-UDP (which we define as Do53) query response times by using a custom tool developed by Hounsel et al. [9] . It uses the getdns C library to issue Do53 queries after each page load has completed. For each unique domain name contained in a HAR that we recorded, we query the resolvers of the approach with which we performed the page load and we record the query response times for all domains.
The HARs we collect also contain response times for each DNS query that was issued during the page load. However, as Hounsel et al. discovered, the HAR response times may be inaccurate depending on how the page load was performed. For example, the initial query in a HAR can have a response time of 0 ms, even in cases where this is impossible because the session started with an empty cache and the latency to the recursive resolver is larger. This can be the case because, depending on how a website issues HTTP redirects, the first query in the HAR is not actually the first query that the browser performed. Instead, the browser might have performed a variety of other HTTP requests and DNS queries before, which may still be in-progress or already cached. Therefore, to ensure that the response times are accurate, we perform DNS queries after the page load has completed through the custom tool. Network Distance We hypothesize that the CDN approach will improve performance for CDN-hosted content because the CDN's resolver will be able to better locate clients to edge servers that host the content. For example, it could easily take into consideration caching at the edge, network capacity, or compute capacity. Therefore, in addition to page load times and DNS response times, we also evaluate the approaches by measuring how close CDN-hosted content is to the client when the CDN approach is used and when the local resolver is used. Specifically, we measure latency to the IP addresses of CDN-hosted resources returned by the recursive resolvers to represent network distance.
Resolvers and Web Pages
To understand the performance impact of D-DNS, we design an experiment to load web pages with various approaches and recursive resolvers. In this section, we describe our choices of approaches, recursive resolvers, and web pages, and we detail the hardware and software configuration we run our experiments on. Recursive Resolvers We measure two approaches of how D-DNS could be used: The random approach and the CDNbased approach (Section 3). As a baseline comparison, we also analyze how the local recursive resolver provided by the university network from which we conduct our measurements performs. For the CDN-based approaches, we analyze content hosted by Cloudflare and Google, and we thus use recursive resolvers operated by them (1.1.1.1 and 8.8.8.8 respectively). For the random approach, we use four popular recursive resolvers, namely Cloudflare (1.1.1.1), Google (8.8.8.8), Quad9 (9.9.9.9), OpenDNS (208.67.222.222), and the network's local recursive resolver.
To construct the approaches, we use HARs of websites that we collected for a previous study (see Section 4.1.2 for details), and we extract all unique domains from them. For the random approach, we randomly assign each unique domain name to one of the five recursive resolvers. For the CDN approach, we assign the domain names for CDN-hosted objects to the resolver operated by the respective CDN, and we use the local recursive resolver for all other objects. For the baseline comparison, we perform all queries with the local resolver.
These approaches do not depend on any particular DNS protocol (encrypted or otherwise). As such, it is possible to configure these approaches with DoH, a new protocol that encrypts DNS requests and responses [8, 10] . This may enable clients to not only observe a performance benefit but also improve their privacy. In fact, taking into account the concept made popular by DoH, that is, "applications doing DNS, " D-DNS approaches could be constructed and deployed easily to end-users, as well as regularly optimized and easily updated. However, DoH is not natively supported by Debian and it would require substantial engineering effort to perform the measurement through the DoH client of Mozilla Firefox itself, which is why we use Do53 to resolve names. Web Pages We conduct our measurements with all three approaches (random approach, CDN approach, and local resolver) for two different lists of websites. First, we select the top 100 websites in the Tranco Top 1,000 list that use the most content hosted by Cloudflare [20] . Second, we select top 100 websites in the Tranco Top 1,000 list that use the most content hosted by Google. This enables us to understand if each approach performs differently with different sets of CDN-hosted websites. We focus on popular websites because users are more likely to visit them and thus experience performance benefits.
We determine if a website uses CDN-hosted content by analyzing the IP addresses of all resources contained in HARs we collected for an earlier study for the Tranco Top 1,000 websites. We then perform RDAP lookups on the IP addresses and mark them as CDN-hosted if Cloudflare or Google are in the organization field [11] .
Experiment Setup
We perform our experiments on a desktop-class computer comprised of an 8th Generation Intel Core i7 CPU and 32 GiB of memory, and running Debian stable (buster). The machine is connected over Gigabit Ethernet to the university network, and it runs our measurement suite to collect page load times and DNS response times. To deploy our measurement suite, we use a Docker container that enables us to clear local HTTP and DNS caches between each page load easily. Moreover, to enable reproducibility of our research and further open science, we will make our measurement suite, including the Docker container, publicly available at the time of publication. We use dnsmasq to implement our approaches, which is a DNS forwarder that runs on our local machine. We configure dnsmasq in such a away that queries are directed to different recursive resolvers based on their domain name. For example, we redirect all queries to google.com to Google's recursive resolver 8.8.8.8 . As such, we create a dnsmasq configuration file with each approach for each list of websites.
This design has some limitations that may affect the generalization of our results. Our measurement's generalization is limited in two ways: First, we perform our measurements exclusively on the Debian operating system, which is based on Linux, which means that Linux's networking stack and parameters for networking algorithms will affect our measurements. Networking stacks are heavily optimized though, which is why we expect our results to generalize across operating systems. Second, we conduct our experiments from a single computer connected to a university network, which means that we cannot easily generalize our results across other machines or other networks, like residential ISPs. However, the machine from which we perform our measurements is representative of an end-user computer. Furthermore, university networks are typically very well connected, which means that any improvements we can observe on a university network are likely going to be a lower-bound in terms of potential performance improvements for end-users relying on a residential ISP for network connectivity.
Decentralization Strategies are Feasible
As DNS queries for CDN-hosted content are issued to different recursive resolvers, clients can get mapped to different edge servers. Accordingly, depending on which approaches are used, clients may be able to download CDN objects more quickly. In turn, a browser can parse and render these objects earlier, and we expect that the CDN approach will cause page load times to be lower than with the local resolver. We also expect the random approach to perform similar to the local resolver. We study page load times across our approaches for each set of websites (Section 4.1.2). Figure 3 shows CDFs for differences in page load times between approaches with the websites that use the most Cloudflare-hosted or Google-hosted resources. The vertical line on each subplot indicates the median for the CDF. A median that is less than 0s on the x-axis is indicated in blue hues and means that the approach on the left half of the caption is faster than the approach specified by the right of the caption. Correspondingly, a median that is greater than 0s on the x-axis is indicated in red hues and means that the approach specified by the left half of the caption is slower than the approach specified by the right half of the caption. Finally, a median that is close to 0s (between -30ms and 30ms, that is approximately one frame when the page is rendered at 30Hz, or two frames when the page is rendered at 60Hz) indicates that the two approaches perform similarly.
We find that the CDN approach outperforms the local resolver in terms of page load times for the webpages that include the most Cloudflare-hosted resources. The median difference in page load times between the CDN approach and the local resolver is 47ms. This improvement is intuitive: The CDN provider can point us to the best place to fetch the objects from based on edge server utilization and network conditions, among other metrics. Interestingly, we also find that page loads with the random approach are faster than with the local resolver, with a median difference of 33ms. This may seem counter-intuitive at first given that distributing queries to multiple recursive resolvers could result in less cache hits. However, the recursive resolvers we distribute our queries to are some of the most popular, and thus likely have highly populated caches. Moreover, we actually always issue queries for the same domain always to the same recursor, which means that we force less cache pressure onto each recursor, which can result in a higher cache hit ratio for each recursor, which, in turn, can lead to faster response times.
Comparing the differences in page load times for the webpages that use the most Google-hosted resources, we find again that page load times are lower with the CDN approach than with the local resolver, by 6ms in the median case. However, unlike the top webpages that use Cloudflare resources, the random approach performs best, with a median page load time that is 19ms faster than the CDN-based approach. We note that there is more variance among all three approaches with the websites that use the most Google resources, which may explain why the random approach performs the fastest. Nonetheless, we find that by distributing queries across multiple resolvers, websites can load faster.
Lookup and Localization Effects
In this section we explore in further detail the effects that result in differences in page load time. We first explore the effects of different D-DNS strategies on DNS lookup times; then, we explore how D-DNS affects the ability of an authoritative DNS server to map a client to a nearby CDN replica. 
DNS Lookup Times
DNS lookup times are an important metric to understand how different approaches affect page load times. Web pages typically include many objects (e.g., images, scripts, etc.), which all must have their domain names resolved to IP addresses. Previous work has shown that DNS queries can cause performance bottlenecks on website page loads [26] . Thus, if certain approaches cause clients to query distant resolvers, then they may observe slower DNS lookup times. This in turns would cause slower page load times, as the client's browser must wait for DNS lookups to finish before objects can be downloaded. We study query response times across our approaches with each set of websites. Figure 5 shows CDFs for differences in DNS response times with the websites that use the most Cloudflare-hosted resources. As before, a median that is less than 0ms on the x-axis is indicated in blue hues and means that the approach on the left half of the caption is faster than the approach specified by the right of the caption. Importantly, DNS lookup time differences are shown in terms of milliseconds. A median that is greater than 0ms on the x-axis is indicated in red hues and means that the approach specified by the left half of the caption is slower than the approach specified by the right half of the caption. Finally, a median that is close to 0ms (between -0.3ms and 0.3ms) indicates that a query for a given domain name from different models performed similarly.
As with page load times, we find that the CDN approach outperforms the local resolver for the webpages that include the most Cloudflare-hosted resources. However, the difference is negligible, with a median improvement of 0.1ms. We also find that the random model performs slower than the local resolver, with a difference of 3ms. These results align with our expectation that the random approach would result in longer DNS lookup times. By distributing queries to the five different resolvers that we measured with, we may get less cache hits, rather than using a single resolver with a well-populated cache for all queries.
With the webpages that include the most Google-hosted resources, we also find that the CDN approach outperforms the local resolver. As with the CDN approach for Cloudflarehosted resource, though, the difference is negligible, with an improvement of 0.24ms in the median case. The random resolver performs even worse than the local resolver for Google-hosted resources, with a difference of 5.25ms. Put together, these results suggest that different approaches have significantly different effects on query response times. By using the CDN approach with a single CDN resolver, clients may observe few differences in DNS lookup times. As more resolvers are used to distribute queries, though, lookup times tend to increase. Despite this increase in lookup times, clients may still be able to download webpages with the random approach on par with the local resolver, as shown by the results in Section 4.2. DNS lookup times times do not appear to have a significant effect on page load times for each approach. Thus, the random approach remains a feasible option for improving privacy.
Effects on Content Localization
We further investigate how each approach affects web performance by studying the distance to the CDN edge servers that each approach resolved and used to fetch the objects. This is particularly important to evaluating the CDN approach, because, we hypothesize that by distributing queries for CDN-hosted content to their respective resolvers (Section 3), CDNs will be able to better map clients to nearby for the CDN approach and the local resolver, then we would group the latencies using each approach for further analysis. Figure 7 shows scatter plots comparing the latency to shared resources in HARs between approaches. The x-axis measure latency to a given CDN-hosted resource with the approach indicated by the x-label. The y-axis measures latency to the same resource with the approach indicated by the y-label. Put together, these measurements constitute a data point on the scatter plot, which enables us to compare how different approaches map our clients edge servers that differ in distance from our client. The diagonal line represents the scenario where each approach results in a mapping to edge servers that are equidistant from our client.
We find that the CDN approach and the random approach significantly effect the edge servers clients get map to for Cloudflare-hosted resources. Figure 6a and Figure 6b show that, when clients use the CDN model and the random model, they often get mapped to servers that are closer to the client than with the local resolver. We note that the difference in latency is typically within 5ms, but this may be significant to improve page load times. For example, if clients get mapped to an edge server with the CDN approach that is 5ms closer than with the local resolver, then clients may be able to download dozens of resources more quickly, which adds up over the course of a page load. Thus, even if the edge server is only a few milliseconds closer to the client, this saving in time adds up.
We find different results with the CDN approach and the random approach for Google-hosted resources. Across any pair of approaches, we find much fewer outliers in terms of latencies to edge servers that host a given resource. Interestingly, however, the CDN approach does tend to map clients to edge servers that are further away than with the random approach. This result coincides with out findings in Section 4.2, in which page load times with the random model were slightly slower than with the CDN approach. Although this result is counter-intuitive at first, we believe that Google's recursive resolvers may not be as widely distributed as other anycast-based resolvers. Thus, if Google does not use the location of their recursive resolvers to perform better mappings, then clients may get mapped to closer edge servers by using other widely distributed resolvers.
Re-Decentralizing DNS in Practice
We have explored how different strategies for distributing DNS queries across different resolvers affect performance, ultimately finding that various strategies for distributing DNS queries across different entities does not have detrimental effects on performance. In this section, we discuss next steps towards a full deployment of D-DNS, including the possible deployment avenues for incorporating distributed DNS queries with DoH, and various practical considerations, including privacy considerations, as well as the potential effects of D-DNS on security (e.g., DNS-based anomaly detection) and content delivery.
Deployment Considerations
Ultimately, deploying D-DNS requires modifying client software to distribute queries to different recursive resolvers. This functionality can be implemented in either the application itself or in the stub resolver that is native to the client's operating system. Alternatively, a DNS forwarder on the local network (e.g., at the client's local resolver, such as in a home router) could forward DNS queries appropriately. Currently, some forms of centralized DNS, such as DoH, are implemented in the browser (e.g., Firefox, Chrome); such browser functionality could be augmented with the ability to distribute DNS queries to different recursive resolvers according to the types of strategies we introduced in Section 3. The same type of functionality could be implemented in a DNS forwarder, such as dnsmasq, as we implemented in the experiments in Section 4. In these cases, local resolvers could be augmented to support DoT or DoH functionality, with queries forwarded to the appropriate resolver depending on the distribution strategy.
Regardless of where D-DNS is deployed, the local resolver must know where to forward each DNS query. In the case of CDN-based distribution, the resolver must maintain a mapping between each domain name and the corresponding CDN-based recursive resolver, assuming that the corresponding object is hosted on a CDN. Maintaining this mapping and distributing it to clients presents a potential challenge; in this regard, a browser-based deployment of D-DNS may prove to be more practical, given that browsers are already equipped to receive updates for various domain name-based lists (e.g., safe browsing lists, ad blockers). In contrast, a dnsmasq-based deployment may prove to be more universal, but updating domain name mappings may be more complex and difficult to manage, particularly across heterogeneous devices and operating systems.
Improving Privacy with D-DNS
The ability to distribute DNS queries across multiple recursive resolvers can help ensure that no single entity sees the entirety of a client's DNS queries. The results from Section 4 demonstrate that distributing DNS queries across multiple resolvers generally does not significantly harm performance, and in the case of CDN-based distribution, it can occasionally even improve page load time. These results demonstrate the potential to explore a variety of strategies for distributing DNS queries across resolvers.
We envision that D-DNS could incorporate a variety of strategies for distributing DNS queries, depending on the tradeoffs between privacy and performance, including those described by Arkko et al. [2] . Although various strategies for distributing DNS queries have been proposed, and this paper evaluates the feasibility and performance effects of some of these strategies, the privacy tradeoffs of different strategies has not yet been studied. For example, randomly distributing queries across a collection of resolvers might prevent any one resolver from seeing the entirety of client queries on the one hand, but over time all resolvers might gain enough information about client activity to piece together sensitive information about a client. There are also tradeoffs to consider between the privacy benefits of distributing queries across different resolvers and potential effects on caching.
Future work could consider how D-DNS and various strategies for distributing DNS queries could improve privacy by defending against various privacy attacks, including DNSbased web fingerprinting and device identification attacks.
Security, Usability, and Ethics
As DNS becomes both encrypted and decentralized, certain security tasks may become more challenging. For example, many security appliances depend on the ability to observe unencrypted DNS traffic to detect compromised machines or other anomalies [1] . The inability to observe a client's DNS traffic at a single vantage point may make a variety of conventional network management tasks, from device identification to malware detection, more challenging in the future. Additionally, other appliances, such as parental controls, rely on the local recursive resolver to filter or redirect traffic (many ISPs implement parental controls at their resolver, for example).
The proposed use of DNS canary domains may provide an interim short-term solution for some of these network management challenges. When a client connects to a network, they could ask their local resolver for the addresses of one or more canary domains. The local resolver can then determine whether the client uses services that depend on the ability to see DNS queries. If so, the local resolver can send an answer such as NXDOMAIN as a signal, which could result in the client disabling D-DNS. Such canary domains are already in limited use for DoH, for example: Firefox has implemented a canary domain to disable DNS-over-HTTPS in the presence of parental controls and malware filters [5] . Unfortunately, canary domains are fairly coarse-grained: they enable or disable D-DNS (or DoH) completely, without allowing a client to enable such a service for a subset of domains. Securing the use of canary domains is also important.
The technical design of DNS resolution is, in fact, a topic with complicated ethical issues. The introduction of centralized DoH, for example, arose out of concerns of user privacy and ISP surveillance; on the other hand, centralized DoH introduced new risks associated with security, privacy, and Internet censorship. For example, among the concerns with centralized DoH is that it could become a choke point for data collection, coercion, or censorship by oppressive governments; various IETF working groups are discussing human rights considerations associated with centralized DoH. Additionally, because the design of DoH and D-DNS have complicated implications for privacy (i.e., which entities ultimately can see a user's DNS queries), the settings of defaults in applications and devices also warrant consideration. For example, the Android OS currently presents an option for "Private DNS" to users, which ultimately enables DoT and sends all DNS queries from a user's device to Google. Firefox and Chrome have also been rumored to be experimenting with the default settings for DoH which could route a large fraction of user DNS queries to a single centralized entity with a single software update. Moving forward, the designs of D-DNS, DoH, and related protocols, as well as their associated default settings and user interfaces, entail complicated ethical considerations that likely warrant separate detailed studies.
Transport-Layer Optimizations
RFC 8484 recommends that DoH clients and resolvers use HTTP/2 as the minimum HTTP version to achieve comparable performance with Do53 [8] ; HTTP/2 may enable DoH to perform comparably with Do53 through the use of a technology called server push, which RFC 7520 specifies as a way for servers to send content to clients before they request it [14] . In the context of DoH, recursive resolvers could predict DNS responses that clients might make based on past DNS requests. In the case of a CDN that serves the content for the associated DNS names, the CDN may be able to proactively push DNS responses for DNS names that are referenced in the web objects that it serves, ultimately preventing the client from having to make additional DNS queries. For both security and privacy reasons, it may ultimately make sense for CDN-hosted recursive resolvers to only be permitted for domains that are associated with the content that they host (as in the CDN-based distribution approach described in Section 3).
Such transport-layer optimizations can further improve the performance of CDN-based distribution in D-DNS. Furthermore, if the CDN-hosted resolver only receives queries for domains associated with the content that it hosts, the client need not compromise privacy in exchange for these performance improvements, since the CDN already knows that it is serving these objects to the client and thus no additional information is leaked by resolving (or pushing) the associated DNS responses for the client.
Conclusion
New technologies such as DNS-over-HTTPS (DoH) are introducing increasing trends towards centralization of DNS resolution. In this paper, we present D-DNS, a new client architecture for interacting with multiple recursive DNS resolvers to improve web performance and privacy. We implement D-DNS and study performance when selecting different resolvers based on the CDN that hosts content, as well as simply selecting resolvers at random, comparing those results to performance achieved using a local resolver. We measure DNS resolution times and find that the CDN-based approach performs similarly to a local resolver, while the random approach offers only slightly worse performance than relying on a default local resolver. Interestingly, when studying page load times, we find that both the CDN-based and random approaches either improve or result in little difference compared with a local resolver, depending on the CDN. Ultimately, our findings show that the D-DNS models we present can improve performance in some cases, and generally do not negatively affect performance in the worst case.
Our research demonstrates that the potential privacy and robustness benefits inherent in distributing DNS traffic across multiple resolvers can be realized without a significant performance penalty, pointing to promising avenues for future work in performance and privacy enhancements. To encourage others to build on and extent our resultsincluding replicating our results, validating them in other network settings, exploring different strategies for distributing DNS queries across resolvers, and integrating D-DNS with other DNS privacy extensions (e.g., DoH, DoT)-we will publicly release the D-DNS source code and all experiment code and results.
